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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNN) are increasingly applied in safety-
critical systems, e.g., for face recognition, autonomous car control
and malware detection. It is also shown that DNNs are subject to
attacks such as adversarial perturbation and thus must be properly
tested. Many coverage criteria for DNN since have been proposed,
inspired by the success of code coverage criteria for software pro-
grams. The expectation is that if a DNN is a well tested (and re-
trained) according to such coverage criteria, it is more likely to be
robust. In this work, we conduct an empirical study to evaluate
the relationship between coverage, robustness and attack/defense
metrics for DNN. Our study is the largest to date and systematically
done based on 100 DNN models and 25metrics. One of our findings
is that there is limited correlation between coverage and robustness,
i.e., improving coverage does not help improve the robustness. Our
dataset and implementation have been made available to serve as a
benchmark for future studies on testing DNN.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen rapid development on deep learning tech-
niques as well as applications in a variety of domains like computer
vision [12, 36] and natural language processing [7]. There is a grow-
ing trend to apply deep learning for solving safety-critical tasks,
such as face recognition [35], self-driving cars [3] and malware de-
tection [50]. Unfortunately, deep neural networks (DNN) are shown
to be vulnerable to attacks and lack of robustness. For instance, they
are easily subject to adversarial perturbation [5, 10], i.e., a DNN
makes a wrong decision given a carefully crafted small perturba-
tion on the original input. Such attacks have been demonstrated
successfully in the physical world [19]. This suggests that DNN,
just like software systems, must be properly analyzed and tested
before they are applied in safety-critical systems.
The software engineering community welcomed the challenge
and opportunity. Multiple software testing approaches, i.e., differen-
tial testing [34], mutation testing [27, 45] and concolic testing [39],
have been adapted into the context of testing DNN. Inspired by
the noticeable success of code coverage criteria in testing tradi-
tional software systems, multiple coverage criteria1, e.g., neuron
coverage [34, 42] and its extensions DeepGauge [26], MC/DC [38],
and Surprise Adequacy [17], have been proposed. Coverage criteria
quantitatively measures how well a DNN is tested and offers guide-
lines on how to create new test cases. The underlying assumption
is that a DNN which is better tested, i.e., with higher coverage, is
more likely to be robust.
This assumption however is often not examined or only evalu-
ated with limited DNN models and structures, making it unclear
whether the results generalize. Furthermore, how a test suite im-
proves the quality of a DNN is different from that of a software
system. A software system is improved by fixing bugs revealed by a
test suite. A DNN is typically improved by retraining with the test
suite. While existing studies show that retraining often improves
1Metric and criterion are used interchangeably.
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a DNN’s accuracy to some extent [34, 39], it is not clear whether
there is correlation between the coverage of the test suite and the
improvement, i.e., does a set of inputs with higher coverage imply
better improvement (on DNN robustness)?
Inspired by the work in [14], we conduct an empirical study to
evaluate whether coverage is correlated with robustness of DNN
and additional metrics which are associated with the quality of
DNN [24]. In particular, we would like to answer the following
research questions.
• Are there correlations between testing coverage criteria and
the robustness of DNN?
• Are there correlations among different coverage criteria
themselves?
• Are there correlations between the improvement of coverage
criteria and the improvement in terms of robustness after
the DNN is retrained?
• Are there metrics that are strongly correlated to the robust-
ness of DNN or the robustness improvement after retraining?
Based on the answers to the above questions, we aim to provide prac-
tical guidelines for developing testing methods which contribute
towards improving the robustness of DNN.
Conducting such an empirical study is highly non-trivial. First,
we need a large set of real-world DNN for the study. However,
training realistic DNN often takes significant amount of time and
resource. For instance, it takes 15 GPU hours to train a ResNet-101
model. Our study trained 100 state-of-the-art DNN models2 with a
variety of architectures with two popular datasets, i.e., MNIST [21]
and CIFAR10 [18]. Obtaining these models took a total of 150 GPU
hours.
Second, we need to obtain adversarial samples by attacking the
trained original models. We adopt 3 state-of-the-art attack methods,
i.e., FGSM [10], JSMA [32] and C&W [5], to attack the original
models, in order to obtain different adversarial sample sets and train
different DNN models. Some of the adversarial attack methods, e.g.,
JSMA and C&W, are known to be time-consuming. It takes us a
total of 1, 810 GPU hours to obtain adversarial samples for all the
original models with the 3 attack methods.
Last but not least, we need a systematic and automatic way of
evaluating the coverage, robustness, and other associated metrics,
which is not always straightforward. For instance, there are mul-
tiple definitions of robustness in the literature [49], [48], some of
which are complicated and expensive to compute (e.g., it took 12
GPU hours to compute a CLEVER score [48] for GoogLeNet-22.). In
this work, we develop a self-contained toolkit called DRTest (Deep
Robustness Testing), which calculates a comprehensive set of met-
rics on DNN, including 1) 8 testing coverage criteria proposed for
DNN, 2) 2 robustness metrics for DNN, and 3) a set of 15 attack and
defense metrics for DNN. A total of 4, 150 GPU hours are spent on
computing these metrics based on the above-mentioned models.
Our empirical study is conducted as follows. For each dataset,
we first train 25 diverse seed models (with state-of-the-art architec-
tures), attack each seed model with different attacking methods to
generate adversarial samples (with varying attack parameters), aug-
ment the training dataset with the generated adversarial samples,
225 seed models trained with original dataset and 75 models retrained using original
dataset augmented with adversarial samples.
and retrain the model. We apply DRTest to calculate a range of met-
rics for every model. Afterwards, we apply a standard correlation
analysis algorithm, the Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient [16],
to analyze the correlations between the metrics.
In summary, we make the following contributions.
• We conducted an empirical study to systematically investi-
gate the correlation between coverage, robustness and re-
lated metrics for DNN. Based on the empirical study results,
we discuss potential research directions on DNN testing.
• We implemented a self-contained and extensible toolkit which
calculates a large set of metrics, which can be used to quan-
titatively measure different aspects of DNN.
• We publish online our models, adversarial samples, retrained
models as well as DRTest, which can be used as a benchmark
for future proposals on methods for DNN testing.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the background knowledge of this work. Section 3 presents
our research methodology. Section 4 shows details on our imple-
mentations. Section 5 reports our findings on the research questions.
We present related works in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review preliminaries related to this work,
which include Deep Neural Networks (DNN), adversarial attacks
on DNN, testing methods for DNN, and robustness of DNN.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
A DNN is an artificial neural network with multiple layers between
the input and output layers. It can be denoted as a tuple D =
(I ,L, F ,T ) where
• I is the input layer;
• L = {Lj |j ∈ {1, . . . , J }} is a set of hidden layers and the
output layer, each of which contains sj neurons, and the kth
neuron in layer Lj is denoted as nj,k and its value is vj,k ;
• F is a set of activation functions;
• T : L × F → L is a set of transitions between layers. The
output of each neuron is computed by applying the activation
function to the weighted sum of its inputs, and the weights
represent the strength of the connections between two linked
neurons.
In this work, we focus on DNN classifiersD(X ) : X → Y , where
X is a set of inputs and Y is a finite set of labels. Given an input
x ∈ X , a DNN classifier transforms information layer by layer and
outputs a label y ∈ Y for the input x . In this work, we try to cover
a wide range of (including state-of-the-art) DNN architectures. We
briefly introduce them in the following.
LeNet [22] is one of the most representative DNN architectures. As
shown in Fig. 1, the basic modules include the convolution layers
(Conv), the pooling layers (Pool) and the fully connected layers (FC).
Conv aims to extract different local features and Pool makes sure to
get the same feature after transformation, i.e., translation, rotation,
and scaling. FC then maps the distributed feature representations
from Conv and Pool to the label space.
VGG [36] is an advanced architecture for extracting CNN features
from images. Compared to LeNet, VGG utilizes smaller convolution
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Figure 1: LeNet-5 Structure
kernels (e.g., 3 ∗ 3 or 1 ∗ 1) and pooling kernels (e.g., 2 ∗ 2) which
significantly increases the expressive power.
GoogLeNet [40] Unlike most popular DNN models which obtain
better accuracy by increasing the depth of the network, it introduces
an inception module with a parallel topology to expand the width
of the model instead. The inception module helps to extract richer
features and reduce dimensions using 1 ∗ 1 convolution kernel, and
aggregate convolution results on multiple sizes to obtain features
from different scales and accelerate convergence rate.
ResNet [12] improves traditional sequential CNNs by solving the
vanishing gradients problem when expanding the number of layers.
It utilizes short-cuts (also called skip connections), which adds up
the input and output of a layer and then transforms the sum to the
next layer as input.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
Since Szegedy et al. discovered that DNNs are intrinsically vulnera-
ble to adversarial samples (i.e., sample inputs which are generated
through perturbation with the intention to trick a DNN into wrong
decisions) [41], many attacking approaches have been developed
to craft adversarial samples. In the following, we briefly introduce
3 popular attacking algorithms that we adopt in our work.
FGSM Goodfellow et al. proposed the first and fastest attacking
algorithm Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10], which attempts
to maximize the change of probability of sample’s original label by
the gradient of its loss. The implementation of FGSM is as follows,
which is quite straightforward and efficient.
x ′ = x + ϵ · sign(∇x J (x , cx )) (1)
J is the loss function for training, cx is the prediction of x and ϵ is
a hyper-parameter to control the degree of perturbation.
JSMA Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [32] is a tar-
geted attack method. First, it calculates a saliency map based on the
Jacobian matrix of a given sample. Each value of the map represents
the impact of the corresponding pixel to the target prediction. Then
it greedily picks the most influential features each time and maxi-
mizes their values until either successfully generates an adversarial
sample or the number of pixels modified exceeds the bound. We
refer the readers to [32] for details.
C&W Carlini et al. [5] aim to craft adversarial samples with high
confidence and small perturbation based on certain distance metric
by solving the following optimization problem directly:
argmin | |x ′ − x | |p + λ · f (x ′, t) (2)
| |x ′ − x | |p is the perturbation according to p-norm measurements,
e.g., L0, L2 and L∞; t is the target label and λ is a hyper-parameter to
balance the objectives. In order to prevent adversarial samples from
generating illegal values, they devised a group of clip functions and
loss functions. Readers can refer to [5] for details.
2.3 Testing Deep Neural Networks
A variety of traditional software testing methods like differential
testing [4, 29], concolic testing [11] have been adapted to the context
of testing DNN [34, 39] to find adversarial samples (in hope of
revealing bugs in DNN). Note that in the setting of DNN testing,
a test case is a sample input. In the following, we review some
recently proposed coverage criteria for DNN.
Neuron Coverage Neuron coverage [34] is the first coverage cri-
teria proposed for testing DNN, which quantifies the percentage
of activated neurons by at least one test case in the test suite. The
authors also proposed a differential testing method to generate test
cases to improve neuron coverage.
DeepGauge Later, Ma et al. proposed DeepGauge [26], which ex-
tends neuron coverage with coverage criteria which are defined
based on the activation values from two different levels. For in-
stance, neuron-level coverage first divides the range of values at
each neuron intok sections during the training stage, obtains the up-
per and lower bounds, and then evaluates if each section is covered
or the boundary has been crossed by the test suite. The layer-level
coverage concerns how many neurons used to be the top-k ac-
tive neurons are activated at least once for each layer (TKNC), or
whether the pattern formed by sequences of top-k active neurons
on each layer (TKNP) is present.
Surprise Adequacy Based on the idea that a good test suite should
be ‘surprising’ compared to the training set, Kim et al. [17] defined
two measures on how surprising a testing input is to the training
set. One is called the kernel density estimation, which evaluates
the likelihood of the testing input from the training set. The other
measures the Euclidean distance of neuron activation traces for a
given input and the training set. Readers are referred to [17] for
details.
2.4 Robustness of Deep Neural Networks
Given the existence of adversarial samples, adversarial robustness
becomes an important desired property of a DNN which measures
its resilience against adversarial perturbations. Following the defi-
nitions proposed by Katz et al. [15], adversarial robustness can be
categorized into local adversarial robustness and global adversarial
robustness depending on different contexts.
Definition 2.1. (Local Adversarial Robustness) Given a sample
input x , a DNN D and a perturbation threshold ϵ , D is ϵ−local
robust iff for any sample input x ′ such that | |x − x ′ | |p ≤ δ , we have
D(x) = D(x ′), where | | · | |p is the p-norm to measure the distance
between two sample inputs.
Definition 2.2. (Global Adversarial Robustness) For any sample
inputs x and x ′, a DNND and two thresholds δ , ϵ ,D is (δ , ϵ)−robust
iff for any | |x − x ′ | |p ≤ δ , we have |D(x) − D(x ′)| ≤ ϵ .
Local robustness measures the robustness on a specific input,
while global robustness measures the robustness on all inputs.
Verifying whether a DNN satisfies local or global robustness is an
active research area [9, 13, 15] and existing methods do not scale to
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state-of-the-art DNNs (especially for global robustness). Thus, mul-
tiple metrics have been proposed in order to empirically evaluate
the adversarial robustness of a DNN in the literature [8, 44, 48, 49].
In the following, we introduce two widely used adversarial robust-
ness metrics (including both local [48] and global [49] robustness)
which we adopt in this work.
Global Lipschitz Constant Lipschitz Constant [49] measures the
sensitivity of a model to adversarial samples. Given a function f ,
its Lipschitz constant is only related to the parameters of f . In our
context, the function is in the form of a DNN. Its Lipschitz constant
can be calculated recursively layer-by-layer from the output layer
all the way to the input layer, taking consideration of short-cuts
in ResNet and inception module in GoogLeNet. For example, the
Lipschitz Constant of a DNN which has a structure similar to LeNet
and VGG is the product of the Lipschitz Constant of all the hidden
layers and the output layer.
As an example, we introduce how Lipschitz Constant is calcu-
lated for a fully connected layer. Readers are referred to [6] for the
calculation of convolution and aggregation layers. Let vj−1 and
vˆj−1 be two inputs of layer Lj ; vj and vˆj be their corresponding
outputs; and ω ji,k be the parameter of the connection between the
kth neuron in layer Lj and the ith neuron in layer Lj−1; and sj be
the number of neurons of layer Lj . The Lipschitz Constant for layer
Lj is defined as α = maxk
∑sj
i=1 |ω
j
i,k | (so that layer Lj satisfiesvj − vˆj∞ ≤ α vj−1 − vˆj−1∞).
CLEVERScoreAnother robustnessmetric we adopt is the CLEVER
score (Cross-Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness) [48],
which is a recently proposed attack-independent robustness score
for large scale networks.
Given a sample input x0 and a DNND, we say xa is a perturbed
example of x0 with perturbation δ if xa = x0 + δ , let ∆p = ∥δ ∥p
denotes the ℓp norm of δ , thus an adversarial example is a per-
turbed example xa that satisfy D(x0) , D(xa ), the minimum ℓp
adversarial distortion of x0, denoted as ∆p,min, is defined as the
smallest ∆p over all adversarial examples of x0. The idea is to ap-
proximately calculate the lower bound of ∆p,min of a given sample
utilizing extreme value theory. The lower bound, denoted by βL
where βL ≤ ∆p,min, is defined such that any perturbed example
of x0 with ∥δ ∥p ≤ βL are not adversarial examples. CLEVER score
has been experimentally evaluated, which shows that it is consis-
tent with other robustness evaluation metrics, e.g., attack-induced
distortion metrics. Readers are referred to [48] for details.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Experiment Design
The overall workflow of our experiment is shown in Figure 2. We
follow a commonDNN testing process (e.g., by [26, 34]), as shown at
the top of the figure, whilst extracting a variety of metrics (as shown
in the middle of the figure) which are used for correlation analysis
(as shown at the bottom). We start with training a model from a
training set using state-of-the-art training methods. Afterwards,
various adversarial attacks [5, 10, 32] are applied to generate new
test cases. The last step is to augment the training set with the new
test cases and obtain a retrained model.
We collect four different groups of metrics to characterize dif-
ferent components of the process, i.e., (1) a set of testing coverage
metrics of both the original and the retrained models, (2) a set
of attack metrics of different kinds of adversarial attacks on the
original models, (3) a set of robustness metrics of both the original
models and the retrained models, and (4) a set of defense metrics
which measure the differences between the retrained model and
the original model. We repeat the above (attack and retrain) process
for the 25 seed models, obtain in total 100 models, calculate the
corresponding metrics and then conduct correlation analysis on all
these metrics. In the following, we illustrate the challenges and our
design choices of each part in detail.
Adversarial Attacks We adopt three state-of-the-art DNN attack
methods, i.e., FGSM [10], CW [5] and JSMA [32], which are intro-
duced in section 2.2, to generate adversarial samples. These attack
methods are commonly used by previous DNN testing approaches,
e.g., [17, 26]. These generated adversarial samples are combined
with the original datasets as new (training and testing) datasets for
model retraining.
Model Retraining For each original model, we obtain three sets
of adversarial samples, one for each attack method. During model
retraining, we combine the original training set with one set of the
adversarial samples to obtain a new training set. We retrain the
original model with the new training set to obtain a retrained model.
As a result, we obtain 3 retrained models for each original model,
one for each attacking method. We follow the standard partition of
6 : 1 for training and testing on the MNIST dataset and 5 : 1 for the
CIFAR10 dataset.
Metric Calculation As our objective is to investigate the correla-
tions between coverage, robustness and other metrics associated
with DNN, we conduct a thorough survey on existing metrics and
collected 25metrics in total. These metrics are categorized into four
groups, i.e., testing metrics, robustness metrics, attack metrics and
defense metrics. They are summarized in Table 1. Note that the
attack metrics measure to what extent the attacks are successful,
imperceptible, whereas the defense metrics measure mainly on how
the retrained models preserve the accuracy of the original model.
For brevity, we refer the readers to the original papers for details.
We calculate values of all metrics based on their original definitions
and use default parameters according to their original papers.
Correlation AnalysisWe conduct correlation analysis, a statistical
technique that shows whether and how strongly pairs of variables
are correlated, on the metrics. We are particularly interested to
observe which metrics are correlated to the robustness of a DNN
model. The resulting correlation coefficient is a single value be-
tween −1 and +1, where +1 (and −1) means the most positively
(and negatively) correlated, and 0 means no correlation. In this
work, we adopt a commonly used correlation coefficients, Kendall’s
τ rank correlation coefficient [16], which is a rank based correla-
tion that measures monotonic relationship between two variables,
to measure the correlations between different metrics. Note that
compared to alternative methods like Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient [33], Kendall’s τ rank correlation coefficient
does not require that the dataset follows a normal distribution or the
correlation is linear. Since we adopt two popular dataset MNIST and
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Retrain
Adversarial samplesOriginal model Retrained model
Train
Robustness metricsTesting metrics
Attack
DNN Attack-Defense Pipeline
Attack metrics Defense metrics
Metrics
Correlation Analysis
Figure 2: Overview of experiment design
Table 1: Summary of metrics
Metric Type Metric Name Description
Testing
NC Neuron Coverage [34]
KNC K-multisection Neuron Coverage [26]
SNAC Strong Neuron Activation Coverage [26]
NBC Neuron Boundary Coverage [26]
TKNC Top-k Dominant Neuron Coverage [26]
TKNP Top-k Dominant Neuron Patterns Coverage [26]
LSA/DSA Surprise adequacy to training set [17]
Robustness Lipschitz constant The global Lipschitz constant [49]CL1/CL2/CLi Clever score with L1/L2/L∞ norm [48]
Attack
MR Misclassification Ratio [24]
ACAC Average Confidence of Adversarial Class [24]
ACTC Average Confidence of True Class [24]
ALDp Average Lp Distortion [24]
ASS Average Structural Similarity [46]
PSD Perturbation Sensitivity Distance [25]
NTE Noise Tolerance Estimation [25]
RGB Robustness to Gaussian Blur [24]
RIC Robustness to Image Compressionr [24]
CC Computation Cost [24]
Defense
CAV Classification Accuracy Variance [24]
CRR/CSR Classification Rectify/Sacrifice Ratio [24]
CCV Classification Confidence Variance [24]
COS Classification Output Stability [24]
CIFAR10 to train 4 different families of DNN models. We calculate
the correlations of different metrics for the two dataset separately,
in order to avoid the potential impact due to the training data.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND
CONFIGURATIONS
Our system is implemented based on the TensorFlow framework [1]
and the architecture is shown in Figure 3. There are 4 layers, i.e.,
the data layer, the algorithm layer, the measurement layer and the
analysis layer. Our implementation is designed to be extensible, i.e.,
each layer can be extended with new models and algorithms with
little impact on the other layers. Our implementation, including all
the data and algorithms, is open source on GitHub3.
3https://github.com/icse-2020/DRTest
Attack Defense
Attack Metric Defense Metric
Testing Metric
Robustness 
Metric
 Correlation 
Analysis
Raw Datasets
Adversarial
Examples
Raw DNN
Defense-enhanced 
DNN
…
…
Analysis Layer
Measurement Layer
Algorithm Layer
Data Layer
…
Figure 3: The architecture of our framework
The data layer maintains all data used in our study, including
the original models, the adversarial samples generated for origi-
nal models, and the retrained models. It interacts with all other
layers. We use well-know models on image classification tasks
in our experiment. To cover a range of different deep learning
model structures, we adopt four different model families, including
3 LeNet family models (LeNet-1, LeNet-4 and LeNet-5 [22]), 4 VGG
family models (VGG-11, VGG-13, VGG-16, VGG-19 [36]), 4 ResNet
family models (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, ResNet-50, ResNet-101 [12])
and 3 GoogLeNet family models (GoogLeNet-12, GoogLeNet-16,
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Table 2: Hyper-parameters of attack methods
dataset attack method model family parameter success rate
MNIST
FGSM
LeNet
0.2, 0.3, 0.4
0.94
VGG 0.81
ResNet 0.83
GoogLeNet 0.71
CW
LeNet
9, 10, 11
0.91
VGG 0.81
ResNet 0.91
GoogLeNet 0.90
JSMA
LeNet
0.09, 0.1, 0.11
0.89
VGG 0.25
ResNet 0.75
GoogLeNet 0.52
CIFAR
FGSM
VGG
0.01, 0.02, 0.03
0.76
ResNet 0.65
GoogLeNet 0.75
CW
VGG
0.1, 0.2, 0.3
0.88
ResNet 0.90
GoogLeNet 0.90
JSMA
VGG
0.09, 0.1, 0.11
0.80
ResNet 0.79
GoogLeNet 0.75
GoogLeNet-22 [40]). In total, we have 14 model structures, which
are representative image classification models.
We adopt two popular publicly-available datasets, i.e., MNIST [21]
and CIFAR10 [18] to train DNN models in our work. MNIST is a
set of handwritten digit images. It contains 70, 000 images in total.
Each image in MINIST dataset is single-channel of size 28∗28∗1. CI-
FAR10 is a set of color images. It contains 10 classes, each of which
has 6, 000 images, and the input size of each image is 32 ∗ 32 ∗ 3.
The algorithm layer contains a set of algorithms for attacking
DNN as well as algorithms for defending DNN through retraining.
For each trained model, we adopt three state-of-the-art attack meth-
ods (e.g., FGSM, CWand JSMA) to generate adversarial samples. The
principle of choosing parameters for each attack is to balance the
imperceptibility and success rate of generating adversarial samples.
For MNIST, we adopt the same parameters from cleverhans [31]
for all three attacks. For CIFAR10, we slightly changed the param-
eters of FGSM and CW in order to obtain better imperceptibility.
The parameters chosen include the attack step size for FGSM, the
initial tradeoff-constant for tuning the relative importance of size
of the perturbation and confidence of classification for CW and the
maximum percentage of perturbed features for JSMA.
To further avoid bias introduced by hyper-parameters, we run
each attack method on the original dataset for 3 times, each time
with a different hyper-parameter configuration. Then we combine
the successful adversarial samples generated from 3 runs of attacks
as the adversarial sample set for model retraining. Table 2 shows
the details of the hyper-parameter configurations for each attack
method, and the column hyperparameter summarizes the hyper-
parameter configurations used in each run of attack.
During training and retraining, we adopt a learning rate of 0.001,
a batch size of 128 for all models in the two datasets. For MNIST, a
test accuracy above 98% is accepted in both training and retraining.
For CIFAR10, a test accuracy above 80% is accepted during training
process and a test accuracy above 85% is required for retraining.
The measurement layer contains all implementation for calculat-
ing the 25 metrics shown in Table 1. We calculate four robustness
values, i.e., Global Lipschitz Constant (Lipz) and the CLEVER score
(CL1, CL and CLi) for each model. Note that LeNet is not feasible
for CIFAR10. In our experiment, since calculate CLEVER score is ex-
tremely time-consuming for GoogLeNet, we reduce the number of
images to 50 and sampling parameter Nb = 50, as it is reported that
50 or 100 samples are usually sufficient to obtain a reasonably accu-
rate robustness estimation [48]. We calculate the coverage criteria
of different DNN models with the same test suite (i.e., the original
test suite of MINIST or CIFAR10) and obtain 14∗4 and 11 ∗ 4 values
of each coverage criteria on MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively.
Defense Metrics are calculated for all the defense enhanced mod-
els, i.e., models after adversarial training, according to their original
definitions [24]. For each dataset, We obtain 14∗3 and 11 ∗ 3 values
for each defense metric on MINIST and CIFAR10, respectively. At-
tack Metrics are calculated for the generated adversarial examples
of each attack method, all parameters of attack metrics are set based
on their original definitions [24]. We obtain 14∗3 and 11 ∗ 3 values
for each attack metric on MINIST and CIFAR10, respectively.
We additionally calculate a set of ∆-metrics, which are denoted
as Metric-diff. For instance, Lipz-diff is the Lipschitz Constant of the
retrained model minus that of the original model. We obtain 14∗3
and 11 ∗ 3 ∆-robustness for each robustness metric on MINIST and
CIFAR10. Similarly, we calculate ∆-coverage metrics by subtracting
the coverage achieved by the augmented test set (i.e., the original
test set plus the adversarial samples) from that of the original test
set. We obtain 14∗3 and 11 ∗ 3 ∆-coverage values for each coverage
metric on MINIST and CIFAR10.
The analysis layer implements the correlation analysis algorithm [16].
We first plot the data to observe the trend and then decide on the
correlation analysis method to use. By observing the data plot,
we found that the data does not show a linear trend. Therefore,
we choose the Kendall’s τ rank correlation coefficient [16], which
does not assume that the data follows a normal distribution or the
variables have a linear correlation.
All experiments were conducted using four GPU servers. Server 1
has 1 Intel Xeon 3.50GHz CPU, 64GB systemmemory and 2 NVIDIA
GTX 1080Ti GPU. Server 2 has 2 Intel Xeon 2.50GHz CPU, 126GB
system memory and 4 NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti GPU. Server 3 has 2
Intel Xeon 2.50GHz CPU, 96GB system memory and 4 NVIDIA
GTX 1080Ti GPU. Server 4 has 1 Intel Xeon 2.50GHz CPU, 119GB
system memory and 2 Tesla P100 GPU. Not all GPUs on the four
servers are fully utilized. We remark that we do not always have
full occupations of all GPUs and 6 GPUs are used on average during
the experiment period.
In total, the experiment took more than 6, 100 GPU hours to
finish. Table 3 shows the time spent on different steps, i.e., on gen-
erating adversarial examples, training and retraining, as well as
metric calculations for each dataset on each model. The unit is 1
GPU hour. The time for correlation calculation compared to the
other steps is neglectable. The most time consuming step is the
metric calculation, which took 1, 350 hours for the ResNet family
on CIFAR10. The most time consuming metrics is the coverage cri-
teria, which varies significantly depending on the model structure.
Adversarial sample generation is also time consuming.
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Table 3: Time for different steps in the experiment
dataset model family generate AE train & retrain metric calc
MNIST
LeNet <0.5 <0.5 <0.5
VGG 160 6 420
ResNet 240 12 1200
GoogLeNet 120 25 300
CIFAR10
VGG 540 12 550
ResNet 450 45 1350
GoogLeNet 300 50 330
5 FINDINGS
5.1 Research Questions
RQ1: Are there any correlations between existing test cover-
age criteria and the robustness of the DNN models?
To answer the question, we conduct correlation analysis on the
coverage metrics and the robustness metrics of all models on the
original test set. The results are shown in Figure 4. The number and
the color represent the strength of the correlation. The correlation
value is a number between −1 and 1. Positive number (and blue
color) indicates positively correlated and negative number (and
red color) indicates negative correlated. The larger the absolute
number is, the stronger the correlation is. The darker the color
is, the stronger the correlation is. We measure the p-value of the
sample data set we have and regard p-value greater than 0.05 as
insignificant. An “X” mark means that we cannot make a decision
because p-value is larger than 0.05 (i.e., insignificant) and a question
mark “?” means that there are no valid results since the standard
variation of the data is 0. The same notations are used in subsequent
figures as well. We summarize the results in the following two
aspects. According to the definition of correlation in Guildford
scale [2], an absolute value of less than 0.4 means that the (positive
or negative) correlation is low; an absolute value of 0.4 - 0.7 means
that the correlation is moderate; and otherwise the correlation is
high or very high (i.e., 0.7-0.9 or above 0.9, respectively).
We have the following observations based on Fig. 4. First, there
is no significant or negative correlation between coverage and
robustness metrics. In particularly, neural coverage is negatively
correlated (i.e., with a value between −0.16 and −0.29) with the
CLEVER score and is not significantly correlated with Lipschitz con-
stant for both MNIST and CIFAR10. Moreover, KNC, TKNC and LSA
also show negative correlations with CLEVER score on CIFAR10. It
suggests that a DNN is less robust if the test set has a larger neuron
coverage (although the strength of the correlation is weak), which
is unexpected. Second, there is no significant correlation between
any of the other coverage and any of the robustness metrics on the
MNIST dataset. For the CIFAR10 dataset, positive correlation is only
observed between SNAC and the CLEVER score, and the strength
is low. This result suggests that a DNN model which achieves high
coverage is not necessary robust and vice versa.
We further investigate the correlation among all test coverage
criteria themselves. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that NC, KNC,
TKNC, LSA and DSA are positively correlated with each other. NBC
and SNAC are correlated with each other with medium or high
strength, whereas they have no (or weak negative) correlation with
the other metrics. The results are consistent with observations re-
ported in [26] and [17] which propose these coverage. This suggests
that despite that different coverage criteria are defined differently,
they are in general correlated (except for the boundary coverage).
We have the following answer to RQ1.
Different coverage criteria are correlated with each other. There
is limited correlation between the coverage criteria and the ro-
bustness metrics.
RQ2: Does retraining with new test cases which improves
coverage criteria improve the robustness of a DNN model?
To answer this question, we conduct correlation analysis on the
difference on coverage criteria and the difference on robustness
metrics before and after retraining. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
We observe that there is no correlation between the difference on
any coverage criteria and the difference on any robustness metrics,
except that there is negative correlation between TKNC-diff and
the CLEVER scores for all the CIFAR10 models. This result casts
a shadow over existing testing approaches, as the existing testing
approaches are designed to generate test cases for high coverage, with
the hope that such test cases can be used to improve the adversarial
robustness of the DNN models.
We thus have the following answer to RQ2.
Retraining with new test cases which improve the coverage cri-
teria does not necessarily improve the model robustness.
RQ3: Are there metrics that are strongly correlated to the
improvement of model robustness?
The above results show that existing test coverage criteria have
limited correlations with the robustness of DNN models and testing
methods based on improving the coverage do not improve the
robustness of DNN models. The question is then: are there metrics
which are correlated to the improvement of the model robustness?
To answer the question, we systematically conduct correlation
analysis between all metrics (or the metrics’s difference before and
after retraining) and the improvement of the model robustness.
The correlations between the defense metrics and the improve-
ment of robustness are shown in Fig. 5. We observe that there are
positive correlations between the difference of the CLEVER scores
and all the defense metrics on CIFAR10. In particular, the correla-
tion is of medium level for CRR and CAV. CRR and CAV measure
how much the defense-enhanced model preserves the functionality
of the original model [24]. Intuitively, this indicates that a defense
method leads to more robustness improvement if the original model is
better preserved by the defense-enhanced model. Furthermore, given
the huge cost on computing robustness metrics, such positive cor-
relations potentially provide a lightweight way of estimating on
the effectiveness of a model enhancement method.
We additionally analyze the correlation between the attack met-
rics and the improvement of coverage criteria. We have the follow-
ing observations from the results shown in Fig. 6. There are corre-
lations between the differences of TKNP and KNC and the attack
metrics. Furthermore, NTE is positively correlated with KNC-diff,
NBC-diff and SNAC-diff. RGB is positively correlated with NC-diff,
NBC-diff and SNAC-diff. Intuitively, NTE and RGB measure the
robustness of adversarial samples, which implies that more robust
adversarial samples contribute more to the improvement of cover-
age metrics. Lastly, there is no correlation between the robustness
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Figure 4: Test coverage vs. robustness metrics
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
Figure 5: Defense Metrics vs. Coverage Criteria Differences vs. Robustness Differences
differences and the attack metrics for the CIFAR10 dataset. For
the MINIST dataset, we observe negative correlations between the
CLEVER score differences with ACAC, ALD2, RIC and NTE, and
positive correlations with ASS and ACTC. These observations indi-
cate that more confident, perceptible and robust adversarial samples
contribute more to improving the coverage criteria.
We have the answer to RQ3.
Some defense metrics are positively correlated to the improve-
ment of model robustness.
RQ4: Are the correlation results consistent across different
datasets, model families and correlation analysis methods?
This question examines whether the correlation results are uni-
versal or rather may vary cross different datasets, model families or
correlation analysis methods. To answer this question, we systemat-
ically conduct the different correlation analysis using data obtained
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Figure 6: Coverage Criterion Difference vs. Robustness Difference vs. Attack Metric
from different datasets and model families. For the sake of space,
we omit the details and refer the readers to the supplementary
materials made available at the online repository for details.
Overall, while the correlation between testing coverage and
robustness on MNIST and CIFAR10 are mostly consistent, we do
observe that the results on some correlations vary slightly across the
two datasets. For instance, the attack metrics (except ALDinf) show
correlation with CL-diff onMNIST but not on CIFAR10. The defense
metrics show strong correlationwith robustness and robustness-diff
on CIFRA10, which is not the case on MNIST.
There are also inconsistent correlation results across different
model families. The correlation results on the MNIST, LeNet and
VGG families are consistent, which is expected since they have
similar model structures. However, it is surprise that models in the
GoogLeNet family often show opposite correlation results to those
of the MNIST, LeNet and VGG families, especially for correlation
between the attack metrics and the improvement of the model ro-
bustness. This can be explained as GoogLeNet has a rather different
architecture from MNIST, LeNet and VGG (GoogLeNet tends to
have more neurons in a layer instead of having more layers).
The above-mentioned inconsistency suggests that the correla-
tion may depend on the dataset and, more noticeably, the model
architecture, which further complicates the picture.
Lastly, we apply different correlation analysis algorithms (includ-
ing Pearson product moment correlation [33] and Spearman’s rank-
order correlation [37]) to observe whether the results are consistent.
Overall, although the results are not identical, the differences are
not significant and the results (e.g., whether it is positively or neg-
atively correlated or whether it is strongly or weakly correlated)
remain consistent. We choose to present the results of Kendall cor-
relation coefficients in this work as it requires the least assumption
on the underlying data. The results of other correlation analysis
algorithms are present in the supplementary materials online.
We have our answer to RQ4.
The correlation results are consistent across different correlation
analysis algorithms but may vary across different datasets or
model families.
5.2 Explanation
In the following, we aim to interpret and ‘explain’ the above-mentioned
results. These explanations must, however, be taken a grain of salt
as they should be properly examined in the future.
First, the reason that existing coverage criteria are not corre-
lated with robustness may simply be due to the fact these coverage
criteria are too weak to differentiate robust and not-robust DNN
models. It has been shown that high neuron coverage could be
easily achieved with a small number of samples [38], and similar
conclusions are given by Odena et al. [30] for coverages proposed
in DeepGauge, such as neuron boundary coverage. This finding
is confirmed by another recent research work [23], which reports
that adversarial examples are pervasively distributed in the space
divided by coverage criteria. The work [23] also suggests that using
structural coverage to measure the neural network robustness can
be questionable.
Second, our results suggest that retraining with the test case
does not necessarily improve robustness. For software systems, a
test case which reveals a bug naturally leads to bug fixing, which
“definitely” improves the ‘robustness’ of the system. This is not
certain for DNN models. because the retrained model could be
rather different from the original model, i.e., it is like a new model,
due to how such models are trained (i.e., through optimization
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techniques which embody a lot of non-determinism and carry little
theoretical guarantee).
Third, we consider it to be intuitive that defense metrics are
correlated with robustness as these defense metrics are indeed less
formal ways of measuring robustness (i.e., in term of how well a
DNN model defends adversarial attacks).
As for the answer to RQ4, we take the consistency between dif-
ferent correlation analysis algorithms positively as it shows that
our results are not the result of certain ‘biased’ correlation analy-
sis algorithm. The second part of the answer may suggest that a
testing method may have to be tailored according to different DNN
architectures.
5.3 Discussion
The results discussed so far are mostly negative, i.e., only several
defense metrics are correlated with the improvement of model ro-
bustness and existing testing methods designed based on coverage
have limited effectiveness on improving the robustness of the DNN
models. The results question the usefulness of coverage criteria
proposed for DNN models. Indeed, a well tested (and improved by
retraining) DNN through existing testing methods might produce
a new model which has higher empirical accuracy on the testing
set. However, the new model is not necessarily more robust than
the original model against adversarial perturbations. In fact, a re-
cent finding shows that DNN model robustness maybe at odds with
accuracy since robust classifiers are learning fundamentally different
feature representations than standard classifiers [43]. For DNN mod-
els to be deployed in safety-critical applications, we believe that
robustness is an as (if not more) important property as accuracy.
The real question thus remains: how should we test DNN models
and make use of the testing results so that the robustness of the DNN
models is improved? Or are there ways to improve the robustness of
the DNN models in general?.
To this question, we do not have a clear answer and thus it
remains an open question to us. It is possible that there could
be other coverage criteria which are correlated with the model
robustness or the associated testing method can help improve the
model robustness. It is however important that no matter what
coverage is proposed, it must be thoroughly analyzed to show its
effect on model robustness.
Our view is that finding adversarial samples should not be the
end of DNN testing. Rather, testing DNNmodels should be designed
in consideration of the model enhancement methods, i.e., a testing
method should produce test cases which are useful according to
the model enhancement methods. For instance, given the positive
correlation between robustness and the defense metrics, we might
want to generate test cases which could contribute to improve
defense metrics such as CAV and CCV.
5.4 Threats to validity
First, theremay be threats to validity due to the selected datasets and
model structures. In this work, we regard each DNN model as the a
program of the same functionality and calculate different metrics on
these models. We assume the metrics are valid across different DNN
model structures and conduct correlation analysis on the obtained
metrics. However, some metrics are not applicable to certain model
structures (e.g., MC/DC is not applicable to ResNet and GoogLeNet).
Besides, Since each model family has limited number of models and
datasets to analyse with, the results may be biased to these specific
datasets and model structures even though we are adopting the
most popular datasets and state-of-the-art model structures.
Second, there may be threats to validity due to the limited size
of datasets, models and attack methods adopted. In this work, we
use 14 different DNN model structures, 3 adversarial attack meth-
ods, 100 models, 2 datasets, and 25 different metrics. While we are
working on more datasets, model structures, etc., we could not sig-
nificantly increase the scale due to the huge cost (more than 6, 100
GPU hours) of the empirical study. For more statistical significant
results, more data points are helpful (or even necessary). We thus
call upon the open source community to jointly upscale our study.
To make sure that our correlation analysis results are valid, we only
report the results beyond a certain significant level by measuring
its p-value [47] in this work.
Third, the evaluation of DNN model robustness in general is still
an open and challenging research problem [51]. Although we are
adopting the most popular robustness metrics, there might still be
threat to validity to what extent these metrics can actually reflect
the robustness of the models.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review related works, with a focus on recent
progress on 1) testing approaches which propose different testing
criteria for DNN models, 2) different robustness metrics to evaluate
the quality of the DNN models, and 3) state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks and defense methods.
Testing of deep learningmodels Several recent papers proposed
different coverage criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a test
set, along with different methods to generate test cases to improve
the coverage criteria. For instance, DeepXplore [34] proposed the
first testing criterion for DNN models, i.e., Neuron Coverage (NC),
which calculates the percentage of activated neurons (w.r.t. an
activation function) among all neurons. Later, DeepGauge [26]
extended the idea and proposed a serial of more fine-grained multi-
granularity testing criteria from both neuron level and layer level.
Inspired by the MC/DC test criteria from traditional software test-
ing, Sun et al. proposed four test criteria based on syntactic con-
nections between neurons in adjacent layers and a concolic testing
strategy to systematically improve MC/DC coverage of DNN mod-
els [39]. More recently, two surprise adequacy criteria [17] are
proposed to measure the level of ‘surprise’ of a new test case to
the training set, e.g., by measuring the distance between their acti-
vation vectors. Our work implemented and reviewed most of the
above-mentioned coverage criteria for a comprehensive evaluation.
Note that some are omitted as they are extremely costly to compute.
Robustness of deep learning models In the machine learning
and the formal verification community, multiple metrics are used to
measure the robustness of DNNmodels. The Lipschitz constant was
proved to be useful as a metric for Feed-forward Neural Networks
by Xu, H. [49]. Segedy et al. [41] leveraged the product of Lipschitz
constants for each layer as a measure of the DNN robustness and
proposed Parseval Networks [6] to achieve improved robustness
by maintaining a small Lipschitz constant at every hidden layer.
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Adversarial manipulation, which looks at the required distortion of
adversarial samples is another direction. Matthias et al. intended to
gave a formal guarantee on the robustness of a classifier by obtain-
ing a robustness lower bound using a local Lipschitz continuous
condition [13]. Recently, Weng et al. [48] extended their work and
proposed a robustness metric called CLEVER score which is cal-
culated using extreme value theory. Our work adopted one latest
criteria from each direction.
Attack and Defense for deep learning models There is a large
body work on adversarial attack and defense in recent years, which
we are only able to cover the most relevant ones. In particular,
we adopted three state-of-the-art attacks to generate adversarial
samples, i.e., a gradient-based approach (the FGSM method [10]),
a saliency map-based approach (JSMA [32]), and an optimization-
based approach (C&W attack [5]). On the defense side, multiple
attempts are available to obtain a relatively robust model at train-
ing phase or detect adversarial samples at runtime. For instance,
adversarial training tries to include adversarial samples into con-
sideration [20]. Another relevant direction is robust training which
tries to train a robust DNN model by considering all the possible
perturbation at training phase [28]. Besides, mutation testing is
adopted to find adversarial samples at runtime [45]. Essentially,
testing is complementary to these defense works.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted a systematic and quantitative empir-
ical study on 100 state-of-the-art DNN models to investigate the
relevance and effectiveness of recently proposed testing criteria
and approaches for deep neural networks. Our study is based on
a self-contained toolkit which implements all the testing cover-
age criteria, two robustness metrics and a large set of measurable
metrics during the adversarial attack and defense pipeline. Our
results obtained from correlation analysis on all these metrics from
different perspectives suggest that existing testing coverage criteria
have limited correlation with the robustness (or the improvement
of the robustness) of DNN models. Furthermore, we provide poten-
tial directions to improve DNN testing in general by correlation
analysis of robustness metrics and other kinds of metrics.
While our results are mostly negative, we believe it is important
that future proposed testing criteria and methods undergo similar
evaluation so as to provide evidence of their relevance. Our models,
adversarial samples, and programs for calculating the metrics are
publicly available and can be used as a benchmark for evaluating
future research in this direction.
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